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THE PAROLE-RELEASE DECISION-DUE PROCESS Am DISCREION
Plaintiff, a federal prisoner, petitioned for parole.' His
request was denied by the Board of Parole. Plaintiff then sought
a declaratory judgment that the board had abused its discre-
tion and denied him due process of law in making its decision.
He alleged that the board had considered only his past criminal
record without investigating other pertinent information as
required by board regulations.2 The district court dismissed
length or style of a college student's hair is irrelevant to any legitimate
college administrative interests and any such regulation creates an arbi-
trary classification of college students" and is, therefore, violative of both
the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment.
Reading further, one finds the court stating that their refusal to extend the
per se rule of Karr to the college campus was "not because the college
student has constitutional rights which his lesser-educated counterpart lacks,
but because as a matter of law the college campus marks the appropriate
boundary where the public institution can no longer assert that the regula-
tion of this liberty is reasonably related to fostering or encouragement of
education. The value of the liberty hasn't changed, rather the setting in
which it is to be exercised has." (Emphasis added.)
There is an inconsistency recurrent throughout Lansdale as Judge Clark
states that "[t]oday's decision should not be read as modifying the rationale
of the majority opinion in Karr. Karr unqualifiedly includes the right of
citizens to choose their mode of personal hair grooming within the real
host of liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from arbitrary
state action. Karr nevertheless concludes that regulation of that right ...
does not lack a rational basis in a high school setting and therefore does
not deprive such students of due process of law." (Emphasis added.) There-
fore, when the Fifth Circuit held that "the adult's constitutional right to
wear his hair as he chooses supersedes the state's right to intrude," it
contradicts the very reasoning upon which Karr was based.
This writer submits that Lansdale reached the correct result, but the
decision leaves confusion in its wake. First, Karr was based on the premise
that high school students had no constitutionally protected right to wear
long hair while attending school. The court in Lansdale finds that such a
right does exist, but does not discuss its origin in the Constitution. Second,
in both the high school and college settings there would be a rational basis
for hair regulations in accordance with traditional analysis in cases where
that test can be employed. Although the court in Lansdale did not discuss
the burden of proof, their reference to "unusual conditions" suggests that a
"compelling interest" is needed. This test would be consistent with this
writer's view that there is a "fundamental" right to wear one's hair as
one chooses whether he is in a high school setting or on a college campus,
and the Constitution requires a compelling interest rather than a rational
basis to infringe on such a constitutionally protected right.
1. Scarpa had been sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 4208(a)(2) (1970), which
provides: "the court may fix the maximum sentence of imprisonment to
be served in which event the court may specify that the prisoner may be
eligible for parole at such time as the board of parole may determine."
Scarpa had been convicted of forging endorsements and uttering stolen
United States Savings Bonds for which the maximum sentence is ten years.
18 U.S.C. § 495 (1970).
2. Parole board regulations concerning what the board should consider
read as follows: "Decisions as to whether a parole shall be granted or
denied shall be determined on the basis of the application, if any, sub-
mitted by the prisoner, together with the classification study and all reports
assembled by all the services which shall have been active in the develop-
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without requiring the board to answer the allegations. On rehear-
ing, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and held that
"[d]ue process rights do not attach at [parole hearings]" and
that "[i]n the absence of flagrant, unwarranted, or unauthorized
action by the Board, it is not the function of the courts to review
such proceedings." Scarpa v. United States Board of Parole,
477 F.2d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 1973).
The power to parole is a legislative power stemming from
the power to define crimes and set penalties for offenses. At
both the state and federal levels, this power has been delegated
to parole boards by the various legislatures and by Congress.
At the federal level, Congress has set bounds within which the
board may exercise its delegated power, but, within these
bounds, a board decision to grant or deny parole is purely dis-
cretionary.3
Traditionally, courts have taken a "hands-off" approach to
parole cases. In Escoe v. Zerbst,4 the Supreme Court held that
probation is not a right, but merely an "act of grace" of the
legislature to which no due process protections attach. Sub-
sequently, other courts adopted this "right-privilege" approach
ment of the case. These reports may include the reports by the prosecuting
officer and the sentencing judge, records from the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, reports from the officials In each institution in which the applicant
shall have been confined, all records of social agency contacts, and all
correspondence and such other records as are necessary or appropriate
for a complete presentation of the case. Before making a decision as to
whether a parole should be granted or denied in any particular case, the
Board will consider all available relevant and pertinent Information con-
cerning the case. In furtherance of that policy, the Board encourages the
submission by interested persons of pertinent and relevant information to
the Board either before or after a Board order has been issued." 28 C.F.R.
§ 2.14 (1962).
Plaintiff alleged as fact that the board had before it only a standard
F.B.I. report, a pre-sentence investigation report, and a record of his
arrests. He further alleged that no member of his family was interviewed
though he supplied their names and addresses; that his potential residence
if released was not investigated; that neither the person who pledged to
employ him nor the people who agreed to act as his "parole advisors"
were interviewed; that his records from previous places of confinement were
not considered. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 468 F.2d 31, 35 (5th
Cir. 1972) (first rehearing).
3. "If It appears to the Board of Parole from a report by the proper
institutional officers or upon application by a prisoner eligible for release
on parole, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will
live and remain at liberty without violating the laws, and if in the opinion
of the Board such release is not Incompatible with the welfare of society,
the Board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner
on parole." 18 U.S.C. § 4203(a) (1970). (Emphasis added.)
4. 295 U.S. 490 (1935).
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in the parole area to similarly deny procedural protections.5
Further, when the attack on a parole board decision was made
on substantive grounds, i.e., that the board reached an incorrect
decision on the facts before it, the courts have pointed out that
the judiciary has no authority to review board decisions.6
Thus, in Cagle v. Harris, the court stated: "[T]he question of
parole is by the statute made a matter entirely for the judgment
and discretion of the Board of Parole. ... The courts are without
any authority to grant a parole.'
While there has apparently been no change in the courts'
attitude toward substantive review of board decisions, recent
holdings on the applicability of due process rights have vitiated
much of the reasoning of the earlier parole cases. In Goldberg
v. Kelly,8 the Supreme Court, in holding that a welfare recipient
had a right to a hearing before being removed from the welfare
rolls, stated that due process rights were no longer to be denied
merely because a privilege was, involved.9 Instead, the court
adopted a more flexible approach to due process, holding that
"the extent to which procedural due process must be afforded
the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss,' and depends upon
5. See, e.g., United States v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1968); Smith
v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Lathem v. United States, 259
F.2d 393 (5th Cir. 1958).
6. See, e.g., Thompkins v. United States Ed. of Parole, 427 F.2d 222 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Frederick, 405 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1968); Brest v.
Ciccone, 371 F.2d 981 (8th Cir. 1967); Ott v. Ciccone, 326 F. Supp. 609 (W.D.
Mo. 1970).
7. 349 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir. 1965). While this statement is typical,
reasons given for this hands-off approach have been summarized elsewhere
as follows: "(1) Release proceedings, because of their very nature, should
be subjective and discretionary; (2) Parole is an act of grace or leniency
rather than a matter of right; (3) An offender is entitled only to due
process during prosecution not after he is in prison; (4) By requesting
parole, the prisoner, in effect, enters into a contract with the state by
which he forfeits certain rights; and (5) Providing due process guarantees
in parole release proceedings would cause disruption and delay." Jacob &
Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners' Need for Legal Services in the
Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. Rzv. 493, 551 (1970).
Professor Davis is critical of the courts' refusal to concern themselves
with problems within prisons. "The time has come for the courts to be
concerned with injustice inside the prisons. The beginnings of such a move-
ment are already discernible. The movement will spread. It should." K. DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATvE LAW TEXT 189 (3d ed. 1972).
8. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
9. Id. at 262, quoting from Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6
(1969): "The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument
that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege and not a right.'" See also
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971).
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whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss out-
weighs the governmental interest in summary adjudica-
tion."' 0
In Morrissey v. Brewer," the applicability of due process rights
was said to depend upon whether a grievous loss was involved
and whether the nature of the individual's interest be "one
within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 2
Applying this test in Morrissey, the Supreme Court held
that certain due process rights attach at a parole-revocation
hearing. The court determined that the parolee's rights were of
such a nature as to include "many of the core values of un-
qualified liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss.' ,13
Thus, some orderly process was required, "however informal.' 4
But, despite this extension of due process protections in
other areas, courts have continued to reject contentions that they
apply in the parole decision-making process. 15 In Menechino v.
10. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970), quoting from Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (concurring
opinion).
11. 92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
12. Id. at 2600, citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972). In Fuentes,
the court said: "The right to a prior hearing . . . attaches only to the
deprivation of an interest encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment's
protection." Id. at 1996.
13. 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601 (1972).
14. In that case, the court held that upon revocation the parolee was
entitled to: "(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b)
disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be
heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d)
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hear-
ing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation);
(e) a 'neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and
(f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and
reasons for revoking parole." Id. at 2604.
The Supreme Court in Morrissey specifically reserved the question of
whether the parolee is entitled to the assistance of retained or appointed
counsel in a revocation proceeding. The courts of appeals are in disagree,
ment on this issue. See, e.g., Bearden v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 405 U.S. 972 (1971) (states not required in every case
to afford counsel to indigents); Bey v. Connecticut State Bd. of Parole,
443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971) (entitled to
assistance of counsel); Woods v. Texas, 440 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1971) (sixth
amendment right to counsel not applicable).
15. Buchanan v. Clark, 446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971); Barnes v. United States, 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971); Schwartz-
berg v. United States Bd. of Parole, 399 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1968) (all holding,
inter alia, that there is no constitutionally mandated right to counsel at
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
Oswald,1 the petitioner asserted that constitutional due process
granted him a right to counsel at a parole hearing. The Second
Circuit concluded that the release hearing is not an adversary
proceeding because the interest of the board and the prospec-
tive parolee are the same: his rehabilitation and successful
reintegration into society. Since it is not an adversary proceed-
ing, no due process rights are involved, and thus the petitioner
has no right to counsel."' In Barnes v. United States, s the Eighth
Circuit rejected a claim that the federal parole statute is uncon-
stitutional because the information used to decide whether to
parole is not available to the prisoner. And, in Buchanan v.
Clark, 9 the Fifth Circuit likewise refused to accept a contention
that failure to parole is itself violative of due process.2
a parole hearing). See also Brigugllo v. New York Bd. of Parole, 24 N.Y.2d
21, 246 N.E.2d 512, 298 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1969), where the court stated: "In sum,
we conclude that the parole release proceeding does not require an adver-
sary hearing. The Federal courts have consistently held, and the Supreme
Court has refused to rule otherwise, that parole hearings do not involve
constitutional due process." Id. at 29, 246 N.E.2d at 517, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 710.
16. 430 F.2d 403 (2d Cir. 1970).
17. A strong dissenting opinion in Menechino, relying heavily on Gold-
berg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967),
argued that parole is a continuation of sentencing, that the procedure Is
virtually unfettered, that the gravity of consequences to the prisoner is
great, and that the prisoner is unable to present his case effectively without
a lawyer. Because of these factors, the dissent felt that minimum due
process requires that the prisoner be allowed the assistance of counsel at
a parole release hearing.
18. 445 F.2d 260 (8th Cir. 1971).
19. 446 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.), cert. den Aed, 404 U.S. 979 (1971).
20. The appellant asserted that he had served one-third of his sentence,
had obeyed the rules of the prison, and there was reasonable probability
that he would not violate parole and would not be a detriment to society.
He argued that the board was required to parole him in these circumstances
and that failure to do so violated his due process rights.
In Tyler v. Department of Public Welfare, 19 Wis. 2d 166, 119 N.W.2d
460 (1963), a prisoner asserted he was denied equal protection under the law
in that he Was denied parole while others no more deserving had received
favorable consideration. The Wisconsin court denied relief holding that a
prisoner had no legal right to parole and that parole board decisions were
not reviewable by the court.
The courts have, however, granted relief on non-due process grounds
in several cases. In United States v. Pate, 401 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 1968), a
prisoner's parole hearing had been delayed for eleven months. The court
held that it was a denial of equal protection to postpone his parole hearing
without adequate reasons. In Palermo v. Rockefeller, 323 F. Supp. 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1971), defendant plead guilty in return for a promise of parole
after serving 18 months. The promise was not kept. The court held that
the board was not acting within the scope of its duties and could not expect
deference from the courts in such a case. But cf. Losieau v. Hunter, 193 F.2d
41 (D.C. Cir. 1951), in which a two minute interview, without further hearing,
was enough for denial of parole without constituting abuse of discretion.
In Monks v. New Jersey State Bd. of Parole, 58 N.J. 238, 277 A.2d 193
(1971), the court held that parole board proceedings must be conducted
1973] NOTES 713
In the instant case the issue faced by the court was whether
the plaintiff had stated a claim for which relief could be
granted.21 The resolution of this issue depended upon three
underlying issues: first, whether any due process protections
are required in the parole-release hearing; second, if so, were
they afforded in this case; and, third, even if due process protec-
tions are not applicable, whether the board had acted in such a
manner that it had abused the discretion vested in it by Con-
gress.2
The court held that due process rights do not attach at a
parole-release hearing. Recent cases extending due process rights
to other areas were acknowledged 24 but were distinguished. They
involve instances where the person would suffer loss of "goods,
rights, or privileges which he already possesses," and they
require "a hearing before governmental action is initiated which
might cause a deprivation. '25 The court took the view that
with fundamental fairness. The decision was based on general administra-
tive law principles rather than on due process. The court also ruled that
reasons must be furnished for denial of parole.
21. Since this case reached the Fifth Circuit on an appeal from a dis-
missal, the court recognized that it was bound to assume as true the allega-
tions made by Scarpa. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Hargrave v.
McKinney, 413 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1969).
The dissent felt that the majority recognized Conley in principle but
did not in fact apply it. They opined that the majority had inadequately
stated Scarpa's contentions and that those contentions, properly stated,
constituted a cause of action. The dissent would have required the board
to at least answer Scarpa's allegations before considering the case further.
22. On first rehearing Scarpa had contended that "he was entitled to
be considered by the Board of Parole for parole eligibility and that, when
so considered, the Board could not act in a manner that was completely
lacking in basic concepts of due process." Scarpa v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 468 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1972) (first rehearing). "In the petition for
[second] rehearing, Scarpa raised a number of contentions not presented
previously. Appellant asserted that he was entitled to: (a) a hearing before
an objective and impartial examiner; (b) adequate notice of that hearing;
(c) an opportunity to confront and cross-examine witnesses; (d) a right
to retained counsel; and (e) written findings of fact and conclusions of law."
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 280 n.7 (5th Cir.
1973).
23. "What this complaint asks this court to do is to hold that the rubic
'discretionary act' does not insulate the one exercising discretion from
responding when it is charged that it has abused its discretion. He says
that there is no greater immunization of the parole board's abuses of dis-
cretion, if they exist, than there is of a court's abuse of discretion. Scarpa
v. United States Bd. of Parole, 468 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir. 1972) (first rehear-
ing).
24. See text and accompanying notes 11-13 supra. See also Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (garnishment of wages); Cafeteria
& Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (termina-
tion of employment).
25. Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir.
1973).
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parole is a change of "status" for the prisoner and that no due
process protections attach for such a change because no depriva-
tion of "goods, rights, or privileges" is involved.2 6 The prospec-
tive parolee has already had his hearing at trial and possesses
no rights which he can lose.
This reasoning was also used to distinguish the parole-
revocation proceeding 27 from the parole-release hearing. When
parole is revoked, the parolee loses the limited freedom he gained
in being paroled, thus bringing due process into play. In the
court's opinion, no such loss is at issue in the release hearing,28
and therefore no specific procedural safeguards are required at
the parole-release hearing. Thus, the board is free to deviate
even from its own regulations.
As pointed out elsewhere, the distinction drawn by the court
between cases involving an interest presently enjoyed and those
in which no present interest may be lost is "essentially the
right-privilege dichotomy in not-too-deceptive disguise. '29 More-
over, it is not fully determinative of the due process issue under
the test set forth in Goldberg and Morrissey. Whether the pris-
oner suffers a "grievous" loss does not depend solely on whether
he is or is not losing an interest presently enjoyed. In reality,
the prisoner does have much to lose because his conditional
freedom is at stake in the release proceeding.80 The loss suf-
26. "The emerging and underlying principle is clear; once a cognizable
benefit is conferred or received, governmental action must not be employed
to deprive or infringe upon that right without some form of prior hearing.
We are unaware, however, of any authority for the proposition that the
full panoply of due process protections attaches every time the govern-
ment takes some action which confers a new status on the individual or
denies a request for a different status." Scarpa v. United States Bd. of
Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 1973).
27. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
28. "Whether the Board grants parole is a clearly distinguishable exer-
cise of discretion from revoking one's conditional freedom. The Fifth Amend-
ment commands that the government shall not deprive one of his life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Scarpa is a convicted felon
currently incarcerated in prison for his past transgressions. This manifest
deprivation of liberty is the result of a due process hearing. The sentencingjudge mandated a possible confinement of eight years. Scarpa now attempts
to equate the possibility of conditional freedom with the right to conditional
freedom. We find such logic unacceptable.
"If the Board refuses to grant parole, Scarpa has suffered no depri-
vations. He continues the sentence originally imposed by the court." 477
F.2d at 282.
29. Comment, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 282, 363 (1971).
30. "This conception that the prisoner, unlike the parolee, has no present
interest In his liberty bears little relation to reality. It is difficult to see
why a movement from confinement to conditional liberty on parole Is any
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fered 1 by the prisoner is similar to that suffered by the parolee
upon revocation in that both face denial of this limited freedom
at their respective proceedings.
Furthermore, while the government has great interest in
summary adjudication from an administrative point of view, 2
it also has an interest in seeing that a parole refusal is not
based on erroneous information or lack of evaluation. The Su-
preme Court in Morrissey noted that there is a governmental
and societal interest in "whatever may be the chance of restor-
ing [the parolee] to normal and useful life within the law" and
in the fact that "fair treatment ... will enhance the chance of
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness."-33 This
same societal interest exists with regard to the prisoner. Thus,
there is also governmental interest in fundamentally fair con-
sideration of the prospective parolee's case. The requirement
of some informal procedural protections would fulfill both the
societal and prisoner interest in a fair hearing.8 4
The court also found that plaintiff's allegations were in-
sufficient to warrant court action for abuse of discretion. Scarpa's
contention that the board had considered only his past criminal
record in making its decision was construed as a claim that the
less dramatic a change In status than a movement in the reverse direction.
Furthermore, while almost every prisoner has a chance for parole, many
parolees are never accused of wrongdoing and hence do not face parole
revocation. The process of release on parole thus occupies a position at
least important, both statistically and substantially, as that of parole revoca-
tion, and should be treated identically insofar as the applicability of due
process is concerned." Parsons-Lewis, Due Process in Parole Release Deci-
sions, 60 CAL. L. REv. 1518, 1539-40 (1972).
31. "Whether the convict is already paroled or still in prison, the real
question is the enjoyment of freedom and community ties in the future.
The enjoyment of this opportunity in the future is as important to the
in-prison convict as it is to the already paroled convict." Comment, 120 U.
PA. L. REv. 282, 367 (1971).
32. Because of the large number of parole cases heard by the board
each year, any increase in procedural requirements would undoubtedly
increase the administrative burden of the board.
33. Morrissey v. Brewer, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 2601-02 (1972).
34. What process is due depends on the nature of the proceeding in-
volved: "not all situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the
same kind of procedure." Id. at 2600. For arguments that due process
requires at least a hearing and the right to counsel in the parole-release
proceeding see, Jacob & Sharma, Justice after Trial: Prisoners' Need for
Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 KAN. L. REV. 493, 551-57
(1970); Comment, 54 IowA L. REv. 497 (1968); Comment, 120 U. PA. L. Rsv.
282, 358-67 (1971).
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board had failed to fully investigate his case.8 The majority
noted that under the criteria guiding the board in making its
decision, 86 Scarpa's past criminal record was a significant factor
and, in view of this record, it "was not unreasonable" for the
board to deny him parole on this basis.8 Thus, further investiga-
tion was not required. But, as the dissent viewed the allega-
tions, the case was not one of failure to investigate fully, but
rather of failure to truly investigate at all.88 Particularly because
this violated the board's own regulations, the dissent thought
"a clear case of abuse of discretion..." had been alleged.8 9
Whether this case is viewed as a failure to investigate fully
or as a failure to truly investigate at all, under the decision,
the board is clearly not required to follow its own regulations.
These regulations mandate that "the Board will consider all
available and pertinent information concerning the case."
Neither is this holding limited to situations, as here, where one
factor strongly indicates a need for further rehabilitation.4 1
And while the court 'attempts to say only that a "full scale
investigation" is not required, the decision actually requires
only enough investigation to determine that parole should not
be granted.
Ideally, the parole decision should be made after a com-
plete review of each applicant's case. When a particular aspect
of the prisoner's background indicates that he is not yet ready
for parole, less investigation may be required. But the board
35. "Scarpa alleges that the Board placed undue emphasis on his prior
criminal convictions in denying his parole. Additionally he asserts that
it did not investigate his marital situation or the Job opportunities which
would be available if granted parole." Scarpa v. United States Ed. of
Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1973). (Emphasis added.)
36. See note 3 supra.
37. "[Even assuming that Scarpa had a stable family and guaranteed
employment, it was not unreasonable for the Board to base [its] ultimate
decision denying Scarpa's parole on his extensive past criminal record."
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1973).
38. rd. at 284. The dissent noted also that Scarpa alleged that he would
"continue to be denied a hearing at which anything will be considered
other than his past criminal record."
39. Id. at 286.
40. 28 C.F.R. § 2.14 (1962). See note 2 supra.
41. The language used by the court indicates no limitations: "We see
no reason why the Board should be forced to make a full scale investiga-
tion of all the supportive facts used by the prisoner in applying for parole."
Scarpa v. United States Bd. of Parole, 477 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1973)
(footnotes omitted).
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should be required to have before it some other. information
about the prisoner so as not to give undue importance to any
one factor through failure to consider others. To require this
should impose no additional burden on the board since its
regulations already require as much.
Peter Wilbert Arbour
LOCAL RULE ENFORCEMENT BY STATE DISTRICT COURTS
Plaintiffs in a wrongful death action were duly notified of
a pre-trial conference scheduled by the trial judge pursuant to
article 15511 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When plaintiffs'
counsel failed to appear, the district court, on its own motion
and in accordance with the local rules, entered a dismissal with-
out prejudice. The Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held,
the local rule which provided the sanction of dismissal for the
failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial conference was
invalid as a violation of Code of Civil Procedure article
1672.2 Boudreaux v. Yancey, 256 So.2d 340 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1971).
Article 1551 of the Code of Civil Procedure, empowering the
trial judge to order a pre-trial conference, enables the court to
fashion in advance the course of a trial. Through this procedure
it is intended that the parties, the witnesses, and the court will
save time, effort, expense, and inconvenience. Article 1551, how-
ever, does not specify what sanctions, if any, may be imposed
for the failure of a party to comply with the order.
Article 193 of the Code of Civil Procedure8 gives state dis-
1. "In any civil action in a district court the court may in its discre-
tion direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a con-
ference ....
"The court shall render an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matter considered, and which limits
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel. Such order controls the subsequent course of the action, unless
modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice."
2. "A judgment dismissing an action shall be rendered upon application
of any party, when the plaintiff fails to appear on the day set for trial.
In such case the court shall determine whether the judgment of dismissal
shall be with or without prejudice."
3. "A court may adopt rules for the conduct of judicial business before
it, Including those governing matters of practice and procedure which are
not contrary to the rules provided by law .... " LA. CoNsT. art. IV § 4
19731
